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FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1358  
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0386  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000596

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STATE PASS TO RPM: CDAVY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017

TAGS: [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [NATO](#) [PREL](#) [IZ](#)

SUBJECT: IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENT SURVEY: NO UNSCR, NO  
NTM-I?

REF: A. SECSTATE 150164

[1](#)B. USNATO 589 (CORRECTED COPY - ADDITIONAL INFO  
ADDEES)

Classified By: CDA Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (B) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: We assess that the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) would be unlikely to continue without the cover of a relevant United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) mandate. It is possible that the mission could continue with a non-Chapter VII mandate, but without some form of follow-on UNSCR we believe Allies would be unable to reach consensus on continuing the mission. NATO Allies have explicitly linked NTM-I to UNSCR 1546's request to international and regional organizations to contribute assistance to the Multinational Force and the sad reality here is that the loss of a UN umbrella would give some reluctant Allies a pretext for killing NTM-I. END SUMMARY.

#### Legal Issues:

[1](#)2. (C) Per REFTEL A request, we have not consulted directly with NATO's Legal Advisor or with individual member states with regard to whether Allies would agree to continue NTM-I minus a Chapter VII United Nations Security Council mandate. We assess, however, that many NATO member states would refuse to endorse a NATO operation without some form of a UN mandate, effectively blocking consensus on moving forward with the mission. Indeed, NATO's decision to act in Iraq came only after United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546 was passed, calling specifically for international and regional organizations to assist the Multinational Force. At each stage of NTM-I's development, NATO has made clear that its mission is in accordance with this and other relevant UNSCRs. While it may be possible to continue the mission if a follow-on non-Article VII UNSCR were passed, we believe it would be impossible to continue NTM-I if no relevant UNSCR existed ) a situation that seems possible in each of the four scenarios described in REFTEL A.

[1](#)3. (C) We further assess that even some Allies who take the position that an UNSCR is not legally required will find it politically impossible to continue to support NTM-I if it does not have the UN's imprimatur. Support for the war in Iraq has always been difficult to find in much of Europe, but the UN mandate did give willing governments a political fig leaf to hide behind. It also provided us the leverage with which we could wrench tacit, albeit grudging, support from reluctant Allies. Again, depending on its wording, a non-Chapter VII UNSCR may still provide us this leverage.

But if there is no UNSCR in 2009, we anticipate that political support for the mission will atrophy, with governments increasingly arguing that NATO should focus its efforts on its Afghanistan mission.

¶4. (C) Comment: These legal and political concerns relate only to NTM-I, an official NATO operation. They do not necessarily apply to the possibility that NATO will at some point agree to open up its partnership tools to Iraq; indeed, they further strengthen the argument that it may perhaps be time to move NATO's relationship beyond NTM-I. We will send our ideas on the possibility of opening up such partnership tools septel.

#### ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO

¶5. (C) Scenario D is feasible if the U.S. can convince NTM-I contributing countries to commit forces to its command. As noted below, 9 of the 15 NTM-I contributing nations have combat troops in the Iraqi theater, and presumably, if these countries agreed to continue contributing troops, even under U.S. command, then they would be amenable to training Iraqis. NTM-I would cease to exist, but its mission would continue with a smaller number of nations operating outside a NATO or UN framework. We defer to posts in those 9 contributing nations to assess whether these Allies would continue to contribute to the Iraq mission, including training, without a UNSCR.

#### NTM-I: An Overview

¶6. (C) Along with the U.S., there are currently 15 other nations engaged in NTM-I, together contributing 183 troops. Those countries marked with stars (\*) have additional combat troops in Iraq.

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COUNTRY	NUMBER OF TRAINERS
Bulgaria*	1
Czech Republic*	3
Denmark*	13
Estonia*	1
Hungary	21
Italy	73
Lithuania*	4
Netherlands	7
Poland*	2
Portugal	6
Romania*	2
Slovenia	2
Turkey	2
UK*	22
Ukraine*	3
U.S.	21

¶7. (C) To date, NTM-I has trained over 4500 Iraqi Security Forces in-country, and another 900 outside-of-the-country. The Iraq Joint Staff College has been re-established and the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command stood up. On 27 October, NTM-I began Gendarmerie-type training for 450 Iraqi Police Officers at Camp Dublin.  
OLSON